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The Pizza Night Game:  










We report the results of a new tacit bargaining experiment that provides two key insights 
about the effects of payoff inequality on coordination and cooperation towards efficient 
outcomes. The experiment features the novel Pizza Night game, which can disentangle the 
effects of payoff inequality and conflict of interest. When coordination relies on focal points 
based on labelling properties, payoff inequality does not interfere with the successful use of 
those properties. When there are efficiency cues that assist coordination, payoff inequality is 
not an obstacle to the maximisation of efficiency. Conflict of interest is the main barrier to 
successful coordination. [99 words] 
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1. Introduction 
We present two major insights about the effects of payoff inequality on coordination and 
cooperation towards efficient outcomes. These are the highlights of an experiment 
investigating the relative roles of conflict of interest, efficiency, inequality and labelling in a 
wide variety of tacit coordination games framed as bargaining problems without 
communication. 
Coordination problems are ubiquitous in economic and social life. In many cases, 
such as driving on the roads and setting prices in illegal cartels, solutions have to be found 
tacitly, without communication. Models of tacit coordination may also isolate significant 
features of real-world coordination or bargaining problems in which communication is 
possible but takes the form of cheap talk.1 In this paper, we consider a simple class of models 
of tacit coordination. These are 2×2 diagonal coordination games in material payoffs. In such 
games, two players each choose one of two strategies, which can be arranged so as to 
produce a payoff matrix in which two pure-strategy Nash equilibria appear in the main 
diagonal with positive material payoffs to both players and all off-diagonal payoffs are zero. 
These games are ideal to study the equilibrium selection problem that is fundamental to 
coordination, because the only features of the payoff matrix that can affect players’ strategy 
choices are the equilibria themselves. Given our interest in the effects of payoff inequality, 
we focus on material payoffs, which, unlike utility payoffs in classical game theory, can 
legitimately be compared between players.  
Classical game theory struggles to deal with this equilibrium selection problem, 
because the analysis of best-response reasoning that identifies Nash equilibria cannot single 
out one of them as the unique solution to the coordination problem facing the players. This is 
most obvious in Pure Coordination Games, in which all the positive payoffs are identical, 
and the same for both players. But it is also true in HiLo games, in which one of the equilibria 
strictly Pareto dominates the other, or in Battle of the Sexes games, in which each player has a 
strict preference for a different equilibrium and the equilibrium payoffs are symmetrical. 
 When discussing games of this kind in The Strategy of Conflict, Schelling (1960) 
proposed that, recognising the challenge of equilibrium selection, ‘rational’ players will look 
for cues available to both of them that make one equilibrium salient (i.e., stand out), and so 
 
1 Schelling (1960: 267–272) offers a theoretical argument, based on backward induction, in support of this 
claim.  
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identify it as the focal point of the game. Useful cues can be found in the payoffs, as in HiLo 
games, in which one equilibrium is Pareto dominant (e.g., Harsanyi and Selten, 1988) – we 
will say that there is an efficiency cue.  Alternatively, cues can be found in aspects of 
labelling. A label is a feature of a game, attached to a strategy or a player and known to one 
or both players, which is irrelevant for the players’ payoffs. Our focus will be on 2×2 
diagonal coordination games in material payoffs in which: (i) for each player, each strategy 
has a distinct label; (ii) the pair of labels, one of which may be salient, is the same for both 
players; and (iii) the Nash equilibria occur when both players choose the same label.  
 Labelling cues are key to coordination when no other cues are available. This has 
been studied extensively in the laboratory. Labelling cues dramatically increase coordination 
success in Pure Coordination games, independently of how these are framed (e.g., Schelling, 
1960; Mehta et al., 1994; Bacharach and Bernasconi, 1997; Crawford et al., 2008; Bardsley et 
al., 2010; Isoni et al., 2013, 2019). However, when the same cues feature in Battle of the 
Sexes games, coordination success is typically less than in Pure Coordination games and, in 
some frames, is less than would result from random strategy choice (e.g., Crawford et al., 
2008; Isoni et al., 2013, 2019; Sitzia and Zheng, 2019). Since many of the coordination and 
tacit bargaining problems that people face in real life bear more resemblance to Battle of the 
Sexes than Pure Coordination games, understanding the source of these coordination failures 
may have vital implications for the real-world relevance of Schelling’s hypothesis. This is the 
main objective of this paper. 
 Relative to Pure Coordination games, Battle of the Sexes games have two key 
features which may be responsible for the less effective use of labelling cues: conflict of 
interest – i.e., the two players rank the two equilibria differently – and payoff inequality – i.e., 
conditional on coordinating, the two players receive different material payoffs. The 
importance of this distinction has so far been overlooked in the theoretical literature, possibly 
because classical game theory treats payoffs as utilities. However, if payoffs are material, as 
in virtually all experiments, they are comparable between players, and experimental 
participants may have attitudes which depend on such comparisons (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 
1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). Writers who have discussed the relative effectiveness of 
labelling cues in Battle of the Sexes and Pure Coordination games have described the 
distinguishing feature of Battle of the Sexes variously as conflict of interest, payoff 
inequality, or (more equivocally) ‘payoff asymmetry’. As long as one confines attention to 
those two classic games, these descriptions are equivalent. Represented as 2×2 diagonal 
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coordination games with payoff parameters x, y > 0, both games have on-diagonal payoff 
profiles (x, y) and (y, x); the only difference is whether x and y are equal or unequal. An 
inequality between x and y is both a conflict of interest (across equilibria) and a payoff 
inequality (within each equilibrium).  
From a theoretical viewpoint, conflict of interest and payoff inequality both have the 
potential to disrupt the process of ‘reasoning together’ that Schelling envisages as the key to 
solve coordination problems (Sugden and Zamarrón, 2006). Conflict of interest may detract 
attention from the common goal of coordinating, if it leads players to construe the game as 
one in which, depending on who gets their way, there are winners and losers (Zizzo and Tan, 
2011). Payoff inequality may decrease the likelihood that players think of themselves as a 
cohesive group, as assumed in some of the theories of team reasoning (e.g., Bacharach, 2006) 
developed to explain focal points.2 
The relative strength of these two mechanisms is a matter of real economic 
significance. Conflict of interest and payoff inequality are potential obstacles to the 
realisation of mutual benefit. A salient outcome that benefits both parties may not be 
achieved because it requires one party to sacrifice their own personal interest, and/or because 
it requires them to accept a smaller share of the surplus than the other. If the presence of 
unavoidable payoff inequality were sufficient to prevent the realisation of mutual benefit, it 
would be bad news for market economies: many profitable transactions would not take place. 
But if ‘stoicism’ about unavoidable inequalities in reward (Bruni and Sugden, 2013) 
prevailed, inefficiencies would be confined to cases in which there are obvious conflicts of 
interest between the parties. 
To analyse the separate effects of conflict of interest and payoff inequality, we devise 
a new game – the Pizza Night game – which is intermediate between Pure Coordination and 
Battle of the Sexes. Like those two games, the new game is to be interpreted as a modelling 
device for isolating specific mechanisms which might operate alongside others in more 
complex real-world environments. Because Luce and Raiffa’s (1975: 51) Battle of the Sexes 
story is so well known, we start from a variant of this story, retaining its 1950s setting 
(conveniently before the era of mobile phones) and what Luce and Raiffa called ‘usual 
 
2 One of the prerequisites of team reasoning assumed by Bacharach is ‘group identification’, which is thought to 
be facilitated by factors such as being members of the same pre-existing social group, belonging to an ad-hoc 
category (Tajfel, 1970), exposure to the pronouns ‘we’, ‘our’ and so on (Perdue et al., 1990), having common 
interest, being subject to a common fate (Rabbie and Horwitz, 1969), shared experience (Prentice and Miller, 
1992), face-to-face contact (Dawes, van de Kragt and Orbell, 1988), and interdependence (Sherif et al., 1961). 
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cultural stereotype[s]’. An Italian couple are meeting for a meal downtown in the evening. 
They cannot communicate, and the choice is between a steak house and a pizza place. The 
husband prefers steak to pizza, the wife pizza to steak, but both prefer a meal together to a 
meal on their own. Pizza is label-salient, because the couple are Italian. Suppose also that 
husband and wife know each other so well that they both know that she enjoys pizza as much 
as he enjoys steak, and he enjoys pizza as much she enjoys steak. Thus, their payoffs become 
interpersonally comparable, like material payoffs in experimental Battle of the Sexes games. 
This game has conflict of interest – each spouse strictly prefers a different equilibrium – and 
payoff inequality – wherever they meet, one is better off than the other. 
The Pizza Night game is obtained by removing conflict of interest from the Battle of 
the Sexes game.3 Suppose the same couple has the convention to have pizza on a Saturday 
night. It is pizza night, and the two spouses have to meet, but cannot communicate. There are 
two pizzerias, where both spouses find pizza equally good. One is Italian, hence label-salient. 
It is common knowledge that she will enjoy food more in either place, so there is payoff 
inequality, like in Battle of the Sexes. However, neither spouse has a strict preference 
between restaurants, so, as in Pure Coordination, there is not conflict of interest. If 
coordination success in the Pizza Night game is as high as in Pure Coordination games, then 
the cause of coordination failure in Battle of the Sexes is conflict of interest. If it is as low as 
in Battle of the Sexes, the cause is payoff inequality. If it is intermediate, both factors are 
important. 
 Prior to knowing the results of the Pizza Night game, it is hard to predict the extent to 
which payoff inequality may hinder coordination. Evidence from games such as the 
Ultimatum and Dictator games may suggest that people may care about both advantageous 
and disadvantageous inequality. So, in the context of coordination games, if payoff inequality 
turns out to impede the successful use of payoff-irrelevant cues when these are the only cues 
available to players, it is possible that its disruptive effects extend to cases in which one 
equilibrium Pareto dominates the other. We investigate this question using variants of the 
prototype case of such situations – the HiLo game, in which one equilibrium (‘Hi’) assigns a 
higher material payoff to both players than the other (‘Lo’). We ask whether introducing 
payoff inequality in either the ‘Hi’ or the ‘Lo’ equilibrium affects coordination success in 
such games when we keep the presence or absence of labelling cues constant. 
 
3 Note that it is not possible to have conflict of interest if inequality is removed. 
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 The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Sections 2 and 3, we describe 
our experimental design and its implementation. We present our hypotheses in Section 4. 
Section 5 reports our main results. Our two key findings are briefly discussed in Section 6. 
 
2. Experimental design 
We study a number of 2×2 diagonal coordination games in material payoffs with and without 
labelling cues. Consider the games with labelling cues first. Their payoff matrix has the 






Each Player i = 1, 2 chooses between two strategies, A and B. In this representation, ‘Player 1’ 
and ‘Player 2’ are not to be interpreted as commonly known labels – in the experiment, the 
players will be called ‘You’ and ‘Other’, because we want to focus on strategy labels. A and B 
are placeholders for commonly known strategy labels. Strategy A’s label is salient, as denoted 
by the ‘*’. Coordination occurs if both players choose A – in which case the equilibrium payoff 
pair is [a1, a2] – or if they both choose B, which results in equilibrium payoffs [b1, b2], ai, bi > 
0.4  
Note that this type of games is particularly well-suited to investigate questions about 
equilibrium selection, because the only useful information is contained in the coordination 
payoffs and the strategy labels. Other authors (e.g., López-Pérez et al., 2015) have looked at 
the comparative effects of principles such as efficiency and equality in games in which the off-
diagonal payoffs were not zero and found mixed results. A possible explanation for such results 
 
4 There is also a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which Player 1 chooses A with probability b2/(a2 + b2) and 
Player 2 chooses A with probability b1/(a1 + b1). We do not consider playing the mixed-strategy equilibrium as 
successful coordination.  
  Player 2 
  Strategy A* Strategy B 
Player 1 
Strategy A* a1, a2
 0,0 
Strategy B 0,0 b1, b2 
 7 
is that, with non-zero off-diagonal payoffs, other considerations, such as risk dominance, come 
into play.5 With our design, we do not have to worry about such confounding effects. 
For the analysis of our results, it is essential to consider how each of the two players 
views a particular game, and to refer to a game as the combination of two suitably matching 
views. We will denote Player i’s view of the game as ‹[ai, aj]*, [bi, bj]›. The corresponding 
Player j’s view will be ‹[aj, ai]*, [bj, bi]›. So, for the game above, Player 1’s view is ‹[a1, a2]*, 
[b1, b2]› and Player 2’s view is ‹[a2, a1]*, [b2, b1]›. In a player’s view, the payoffs of the label-
salient equilibrium (when there is one) are listed first and, within each payoff pair, the player’s 
own payoff is shown first, followed by their co-player’s payoff. So, a game view tells a player 
what the equilibrium payoffs are and if one of the equilibria is identified by a salient strategy 
label. A game has a payoff cue unless either a1 = b1 and a2 = b2 (i.e., the coordination payoffs 
of two equilibria are identical), or a1 = b2 and a2 = b1 (i.e., the coordination payoffs of the two 
equilibria are symmetrical). An example of a payoff cue is the efficiency cue found in HiLo 
games. In this setup, there are cases in which any distinction between the two players would 
be arbitrary, because the two relevant views are identical. The most obvious case is when a1 = 
a2 = b1 = b2, which corresponds to a Pure Coordination game. In such cases, the data from such 
views can be pooled in the analysis. 
 We study all the games that can be obtained by independently assigning one of two 
positive values – a small value S and a large value L, 0 < S < L – to each of ai, aj, bi and bj in 
the Players’ views. There are sixteen possible views, C1 to C16, which can be matched to 
form a total of ten games with labelling cues, listed in the corresponding column of Table 1 
that, for each game, reports the full payoff matrix, as well as the view notation for Player 1 
(Row) and Player 2 (Col).6  
(Insert Table 1 here)  
The first three panels in Table 1 contain games with no payoff cues. When all payoffs 
are S, each player faces view C1. When they are all L, each faces C2. These cases constitute 
 
5 For instance, in López-Pérez et al.’s game 3, the efficient equilibrium is [110, 110], the inefficient [90, 90] 
(payoffs in experimental points). With off-diagonal payoffs equal to zero, this would be a HiLo game, in which 
we know from previous studies that most players would choose the strategies leading to the Pareto-dominant 
equilibrium. But in their game the off-diagonal payoffs were [0, 90] and [90, 0], making the strategy leading to 
the equal equilibrium also a safe strategy ensuring a payoff of 90 experimental points. López-Pérez et al. found 
that 16 percent of the games ended at [110, 110] and 35 percent ended at [90, 90]. 
6 Using all combinations of S and L has the advantage of making transparent the mechanism by which our 
design is able to produce the games we need to investigate our hypotheses. This principle means, however, that 
there may be other games that, although informative, are not central to our research questions. 
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Pure Coordination games with labelling cues, PC* S and PC* L. Together, C3 and C4 
constitute a Pizza Night game with a salient equilibrium (PN*). The player facing C3 is 
favoured in the sense that the inequality between L and S is in her favour in both equilibria. 
Similarly, the player facing C4 is disfavoured. The combination of C5 and C6 creates a Battle 
of the Sexes game with a salient equilibrium (BS*). The labelling cue favours the player 
facing C5.  
All other games in Table 1 contain an efficiency cue, as one of the equilibria Pareto 
dominates the other. The two games in the fourth row are HiLo games. When both players 
face C7, the ‘Hi’ equilibrium is label-salient (Hi*Lo) – labelling and efficiency cues are 
congruent with each other because they select the same equilibrium. When both face C8, the 
‘Lo’ equilibrium is label-salient (HiLo*), and the labelling cue is incongruent with the 
efficiency cue, because it points to a different equilibrium. The remaining four games, shown 
in the last two rows, modify Hi*Lo and HiLo* by making either the ‘Lo’ or the ‘Hi’ 
equilibrium unequal. This results in two Lo-Unequal games, in which the inefficient 
equilibrium is unequal (Hi*Lo≠, views C9 and C10, in which the efficient equilibrium is 
label-salient; and HiLo≠*, views C11 and C12, in which the inefficient equilibrium is label-
salient); and two Hi-Unequal games, in which the efficient equilibrium is unequal (Hi≠*Lo, 
views C13 and C14, in which the efficient equilibrium is label-salient; and Hi≠Lo*, views 
C15 and C16, in which the inefficient equilibrium is label-salient). 
The games on the right-hand side of Table 1 are obtained by removing the salient 
labels from the games just described.7 In the corresponding views, the order of the two payoff 
pairs has no significance. This produces a total of seven games without labelling cues, 
because three pairs of games with salient labels (Hi*Lo and HiLo*; Hi*Lo≠ and HiLo≠*; and 
Hi≠*Lo and Hi≠Lo*) differ only in terms of which equilibrium is label-salient, and removing 




7 Note that, in games without payoff cues, every strategy must have a distinct label (if not, players could not 
distinguish the two strategies and it would not be possible to determine the outcome of the game based on their 
undistinguishable choices). Whenever there are commonly known labels, it is not possible to completely 
eliminate all possible cues that players may find in them. To isolate the effects of labelling, we need to study 
games that differ with respect to the comparative salience of their labels. See Section 3. 
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Diagonal coordination games like the ones in our experiment have been studied in the 
literature using a variety of different frames. We adopt the bargaining table frame developed 
by Isoni et al. (2013, 2019), which reliably produces the lower coordination success in Battle 
of the Sexes than Pure Coordination and HiLo games that is the focus of our paper. Since 
Battle of the Sexes games can be seen as stylised models of tacit bargaining, using a design 
with bargaining-like features is compatible with our focus on the effects of conflict of 
interest. The bargaining table design does that with an intuitive visual representation. The 
design has also the advantage of providing a straightforward way of representing all the 
games shown in Table 1. 
 An example of the bargaining table version of the Pizza Night game is shown in 
Figure 1. 
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
The game is presented as a 9×9 grid of squares – the bargaining table – in which a player 
(‘You’) is assigned to the red base at the bottom, and faces an ‘Other’ player who sees the 
game from the grey base at the top. The ‘Other’ player in table (i) is the ‘You’ player in table 
(ii), and vice versa. Players can easily work out how the bargaining table looks from their co-
player’s perspective.  
 The players’ objective is to tacitly agree on a division of the discs – the two round 
objects scattered on the table. Each disc has a value (in UK pounds) to each player, 
represented by the number shown on the half of the disc facing the player’s own base. So, in 
table (i), the ‘You’ player’s value of each of the two discs is £13 while the ‘Other’ player’s 
value of both discs is £8. All values, as well as the location of the discs on the table, are 
common knowledge between the players. Each player separately indicates which disc(s) they 
propose to take, claiming either none, one, or both discs, without knowledge of their co-
player’s claims. Discs are claimed by clicking on them, and claims can be cancelled with a 
further click. Claims are visualised by colouring the claimed disc in red and connecting it to 
the red base with a red line, and can be freely changed until they are submitted.8 There is an 
agreement on the division of the discs whenever no disc is claimed by both players. In that 
 
8 Some screenshots of the experiment can be found in the Appendix. 
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case, each player earns a payoff equal to the value to them of the disc(s) they claimed. If any 
disc is claimed by both players, there is no agreement and both players earn a payoff of zero.9  
The four strategies available to each player can be abstractly described as: claim none 
of the discs, claim only the disc close to one’s base, claim only the disc far from one’s base, 
or claim both discs. Because claiming no discs ensures a payoff of zero, it is a weakly 
dominated strategy. Once this is eliminated, it makes no sense to claim both discs.10 When 
each player claims exactly one disc, the game reduces to a 22 diagonal coordination game 
with two pure-strategy Nash equilibria, whose payoff matrix is identical to that of a Pizza 
Night game. Thus, tables (i) and (ii) in Figure 1 correspond to views C3 and C4 respectively, 
with S = 8 and L = 13. The commonly-known labels of the two strategies available to each 
player are Close and Far – i.e., it can be assumed that players describe the game to 
themselves as one in which they are choosing whether to claim the close disc or the far disc. 
The resulting game has a labelling cue if one of these labels is salient. In the bargaining table 
design, Close can be treated as label-salient, because in Pure Coordination games of this type 
players have an overwhelming tendency to choose the disc that is closer to their base (see 
Isoni et al., 2013, 2014, 2019).  
Tables (iii) and (iv) produce an identical payoff matrix, except that now the strategies 
can be labelled Left (i.e., claim the disc more to the left as seen from one’s base) and Right 
(i.e., claim the disc more to the right). Empirically, neither Left nor Right is salient (see Isoni 
et al., 2014, 2019). Tables (iii) and (iv) correspond to views N3 and N4 respectively, with S = 
8 and L = 13, and so constitute a Pizza Night game without labelling cues. The only 
difference between the two Pizza Night games shown in Figure 1 is a matter of labelling. 
Thus, the bargaining table design introduces salient labels in the form of closeness cues. By 
implementing different games in this design, we can study the effect of payoff inequality on 
coordination success for given labelling cues. 
By independently assigning the two values in an {S, L} payoff pair to the two sides of 
each disc, we can produce bargaining table versions of all the games listed in Table 1. In the 
experiment, each participant faced an independently determined sequence of twenty-six 
‘scenarios’, corresponding to views C1–C16 and N1–N10. All scenarios had just two discs, 
 
9 The full text of the experimental instructions is reproduced in the Appendix. 
10 Allowing players to claim none or both discs enhances the bargaining feel of the game. Isoni et al. (2013) also 
show that it results in more effective use of salient labels. Weakly dominated claims are rare (see Isoni et al., 
2013; 2019). 
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but differed with respect to the degree of inequality in the payoff pair (we counterbalanced 
the four pairs {10, 11}, {8, 13}, {6, 15}, and {4, 17}) and in the exact positions of the Close 
and Far (respectively, Left and Right) disc for each pair of matched game views.11 Changing 
the difference between S and L allows us to investigate whether, if inequality matters, its size 
is also important. Based on previous work, we did not expect different disc layouts to have 
systematic effects,12 but making each task more novel reduced the potential spill-overs 
between games, which is important given our interest in one-shot tacit games. For the same 
reason, there was no feedback between scenarios. This will allow us to treat each of them as a 
one-shot game.  
The decisions in the experiment were incentivised. Participants were told that they 
had been matched with another anonymous person for the duration of the experiment. At the 
end of the experiment, one game was selected for each pair of participants, and they were 
paid on the basis of the claims they made in the selected game. In addition, they received a 
participation fee of £5. 
 
4. Hypotheses 
In this section, we state explicit hypotheses regarding conflict of interest and payoff 
inequality in our games. Given our design approach of producing an exhaustive set of games 
for given {L, S} payoff pairs, there are other factors beyond our main research questions that 
can be investigated with our experiment. An obvious question is whether labelling cues have 
different effects in different types of games. We will briefly look at this issue by comparing 
games with and without those cues. Readers interested in other aspects (e.g., the effects of 
labelling cues for different payoff pairs) are referred to the Appendix. 
 All our hypotheses are about coordination success – the probability that, in a given 
game, randomly chosen pairs of players select strategies leading to an agreement on the 
division of the discs.13 As stated in the Introduction, our primary interest is in disentangling 
the effects of conflict of interest and payoff inequality in games without payoff cues (Pure 
 
11 More details on these aspects of the design can be found in the Appendix. 
12 This expectation was confirmed. See details in the Appendix. 
13 Successful coordination typically occurs if each player claims exactly one disc and the two players claim 
different discs. But it may also occur whenever at least one of the players claims no disc (in which case it does 
not matter how many discs, if at all, are claimed by the other player). 
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Coordination, Pizza Night, and Battle of the Sexes). However, since payoff inequality may 
matter also in games with efficiency cues, we will also investigate whether it hinders 
coordination in such games (HiLo games and variants with payoff inequality).14   
Our first three hypotheses are about games without payoff cues. We begin from the 
established finding that, for labelling cues of given salience, coordination success tends to be 
systematically lower in Battle of the Sexes games than in Pure Coordination games. Our first 
hypothesis is that our experiment replicates this pattern. 
Hypothesis 1 – Validation. In the presence of labelling cues, coordination success is greater 
in Pure Coordination games than in Battle of the Sexes games. 
As we have explained, our new Pizza Night game with labelling cues allows us to disentangle 
the effects of conflict of interest and payoff inequality. We can do this by comparing 
coordination success in this game with that in Battle of the Sexes and that in Pure 
Coordination games with the same labelling cues. The first comparison isolates the effect of 
conflict of interest, the second the effect of payoff inequality. These are our next two 
hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 2 – Effect of conflict of interest. In the presence of labelling cues, coordination 
success is greater in Pizza Night games than in Battle of the Sexes games. 
Hypothesis 3 – Effect of payoff inequality. In the presence of labelling cues, coordination 
success is greater in Pure Coordination games than in Pizza Night games. 
If we find support for both hypotheses, it means that both factors have a disruptive effect on 
coordination. If we find support for Hypothesis 2 but not for Hypothesis 3, it means that the 
only disruptive factor is conflict of interest. If only Hypothesis 3 is supported, the only source 
of disruption is payoff inequality. 
 Our remaining hypotheses involve games in which there are efficiency cues. We 
investigate whether the possible disruptive effects of payoff inequality extend to such games. 
The neatest case of this kind is represented by a HiLo game without labelling cues. The 
presence of a Pareto dominant equilibrium is the only available cue, and is normally used 
effectively to achieve coordination (e.g., Bacharach, 2006; Bardsley et al., 2010; Isoni et al., 
2019). If strategies leading to an unequal equilibrium are less likely to be chosen, making the 
 
14 Note that, in 2×2 diagonal coordination games, conflict of interest cannot arise when one of the equilibria 
(weakly) Pareto dominates the other. 
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‘Hi’ equilibrium unequal, but still weakly Pareto dominant (as in Hi-Unequal games), will 
obstruct coordination, while making the ‘Lo’ equilibrium unequal, but still weakly Pareto 
dominated (as in Lo-Unequal games), may increase coordination (if not already maximal), 
but will certainly not decrease it. If labelling cues have effects which are independent of 
payoff inequality, similar effects may arise in games in which those cues are present. On 
these bases, we can state our final two hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 4 – Inequality of the efficient equilibrium. Coordination success is greater in 
HiLo games than in Hi-Unequal games, both (a) in the absence and (b) in the presence of 
labelling cues. 
Hypothesis 5 – Inequality of the inefficient equilibrium. Coordination success is at least 
as great in Lo-Unequal games as in HiLo games, both (a) in the absence and (b) in the 
presence of labelling cues. 
 
5. Experimental results 
We recruited 200 participants from the general student population of the University of East 
Anglia (UK), using the hRoot online recruitment system (Bock et al., 2012) in the Autumn of 
2016. Sessions took on average sixty minutes and resulted in an average payment of £13.46, 
including the £5 participation fee. The experiment was programmed in zTree (Fischbacher, 
2007). 
 Before we turn to the tests of our central hypotheses in Section 5.4, we discuss some 
general aspects of our results. In Section 5.1, we look at the patterns of claims that 
participants made in the games with and without labelling cues. In Section 5.2, we report the 
patterns of non-dominated claims in all our games broken down by payoff pair. Finally, in 
Section 5.3 we test for the effects of labelling cues on coordination success by comparing 
games with and without those cues.  
 
5.1  Aggregate claims 
An aggregate summary of the claims made by the participants in our experiment is reported 
in Table 2a for the games with labelling cues and in Table 2b for the games without labelling 
cues. Tables 2a and 2b aggregate the data across different payoff pairs, and, consistently with 
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this approach, also between Pure Coordination games in which all payoffs where S and those 
in which they were all L. 
For each of the sixteen scenarios with labelling cues, Table 2a reports the frequency 
of each of the four available strategies (including the weakly dominated ones). Excluding the 
cases in which no disc or both discs were claimed, the columns headed ‘Single-disc Close 
claims’ and ‘Single-disc High-Value claims’ report the percentage of participants choosing 
the disc closer to their base or, respectively, the disc more valuable to them. The last column 
reports the median response time, in seconds, for the relevant scenario. Response times can 
be useful in the interpretation of our results, because in addition to reflecting the different 
complexity of different games, for games of comparable complexity they may highlight the 
cases in which the existence of forces pulling in different directions makes the decision more 
difficult for the participant.15  
Table 2b reports the corresponding information for the games without labelling cues, 
but instead of the ‘Single-disc Close claims’ it reports the ‘Single-disc Left claims’ (recall 
that, in the games without labelling cues, the two discs were always in the middle row of the 
bargaining table, so one was more to the right as seen from the player’s base).  
(Insert Tables 2a and 2b here) 
 The first aspect to notice is that weakly dominated claims were rare. The percentage 
of cases in which none of the discs was claimed is lower than 1 percent with or without 
labelling cues. Both discs were claimed on average in just 2.9 percent of the cases in games 
with labelling cues and 5.1 percent of the cases in games without labelling cues.  
 When there were labelling cues, the single-disc claim percentages reveal that the close 
disc was claimed by the majority of participants in Pure Coordination, Pizza Night, and 
Battle of the Sexes games. (Recall that, in these games, there are no payoff cues and the only 
way to select a (pure-strategy) equilibrium is by using labels.) However, the close disc was 
claimed much less often in Battle of the Sexes than in Pizza Night and Pure Coordination 
games. The other games with labelling cues also have an efficiency cue, as one equilibrium 
(weakly) Pareto dominates the other. This cue was extensively used. The percentage of 
single-disc claimants making choices consistent with selecting the efficient equilibrium 
 
15 In many tasks, response time tends to be longer when the available options are finely balanced for the 
participants, indicating that they find it more difficult to come to a decision (e.g., Tyebjee, 1979; Busemeyer and 
Townsend, 1993; Moffatt, 2005). 
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ranges from 80 to 91. Labelling cues disrupted this tendency slightly (compare C7 and C8, 
C10 and C12, C13 and C15), but making one equilibrium unequal did not interfere with the 
use of the efficiency cue (compare C7 with C9-C10 and C13-C14, and compare C8 with 
C11-C12 and C15-C16). 
 In games without labelling cues, there was a slight tendency for the right disc to be 
chosen more often than the left disc (overall, 46 percent of single-disc claims were on the left 
disc), especially in Pure Coordination games, Pizza Night games and Hi-Unequal games. 
When there was a disc that was worth more than the other, the vast majority of participants 
who claimed just one disc chose the more valuable one. The notable exception is the Battle of 
the Sexes game, in which the High-Value disc was claimed overall only by 48 percent of the 
single-disc claimants. 
 As noted earlier, the response time data reflect both how easy it was to process the 
information contained in the game display and how much deliberation took place after that 
information had been assimilated. It seems clear that, in the presence of labelling cues, the 
Pure Coordination game is the easiest to read (there is just one payoff value). Since the only 
asymmetry in this game is in the labelling, and since closeness is a highly salient cue, little 
deliberation seems to be required. It is therefore unsurprising that this game had the shortest 
response times. The Hi*Lo game provides another relevant benchmark. For a player who 
understands the structure of this game, the symmetry of the positions of the players, the 
absence of inequality and conflict of interest and the congruence of the efficiency and 
closeness cues makes ‘close’ a particularly obvious choice. However, the Hi*Lo game is not 
easy to read (the two discs are different from one another, and each has two payoff values). 
The fact that response times were longer in the Hi*Lo than in the Pure Coordination game 
(p<0.01) is probably due to information processing. In terms of ease of processing, Battle of 
the Sexes (non-identical discs, each with only one value) and Pizza Night games (identical 
discs, each with two values) seem intermediate between Pure Coordination and Hi*Lo 
games. It is noteworthy that response times in the Pizza Night game (in which players had to 
deal with inequality but not conflict of interest) were longer than in the Hi*Lo game (p < 
0.01) but shorter than in the Battle of the Sexes game (in which players had to deal with 
both). The response times in games without labelling cues show similar patterns, with Pizza 
Night and Battle of the Sexes taking the longest.  
 Finally, we briefly discuss the possibility that, in spite of the absence of feedback 
between games and the independent randomisation of the order of the games for each 
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participant, the sequence in which games were played had a significant impact on players’ 
decisions. The most obvious effect of this kind is the possibility that, having faced a game 
with inequality in their favour (or disfavour), a player may have tried to ‘average out’ the 
value of their claims in the subsequent game. Such a behaviour might have been encouraged 
by our matching protocol, in which, although unknown, the matched participant was the same 
for the whole sequence of games. It must be noted that, given the counterbalancing and 
randomisation built into our design, any such order effect would not invalidate the tests of 
our main hypotheses. To investigate this possibility, we have looked at the most 
uncontroversial case: when a Pizza Night game (with or without labelling cues) was 
immediately followed by a Battle of the Sexes game (with or without labelling cues). In the 
Pizza Night game, the inequality is unequivocally in one’s favour or disfavour, so any 
tendency to average out should manifest itself in a tendency to choose the more valuable disc 
more often when the Battle of the Sexes game followed a Pizza Night game with favourable 
inequality and less often when it followed a game with unfavourable inequality. We have 
identified ninety relevant cases but, controlling for the payoff inequality in each of the two 
games involved, we have found no systematic evidence of a tendency to balance inequality 
out.16 
 
5.2  Claims by payoff pair 
As we have seen, dominated claims were rare. In this sub-section, we look at the patterns of 
claims broken down by payoff pair, focusing on the cases in which exactly one disc was 
claimed. The relevant data are reported in Table 3a for the games with labelling cues and 
Table 3b for the games without labelling cues. Because of our interest in the patterns of 
claims contingent on the associated payoff values, in the Pure Coordination game we separate 
the cases in which all discs were valued S to both players from those in which all discs were 
valued L. 
(Insert Tables 3a and 3b here) 
In games with labelling cues, an interesting statistic is the percentage of single-disc 
claimants who claimed the close disc in games without payoff cues (PC*, PN* and BS*), and 
the percentage of participants who claimed the disc consistent with the efficient equilibrium 
 
16 The details of this analysis can be found in the Appendix. 
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in games with payoff cues (Hi*Lo, HiLo*, Hi*Lo≠, HiLo≠*, Hi≠*Lo and Hi≠Lo*). Note 
that, in cases in which there is both a disc worth more and a salient disc, the percentage 
reported allows for the identification of the one that is not provided. For example, the close 
disc in the BS corresponds to the more valuable disc in view C5 and to the less valuable disc 
in view C6. For games without labelling cues, we report percentage of Left claims for PC, PN 
and BS, in which there are no efficiency cues. Because in BS each player also has a disc 
worth more to her, we also report the percentage of ‘Single-disc High-value claims’. For the 
HiLo game and its Unequal variants we report the claims consistent with the efficient 
equilibrium. 
The patterns of single-disc claims are very clear. With the exception of the Battle of 
the Sexes game, varying the payoff pair has very little impact on the patterns of single-disc 
claims, irrespective of the presence of labelling cues. While this may not be surprising for the 
Pure Coordination and HiLo games, in which there is no inequality, it is an interesting 
finding that even relatively large inequalities have virtually no impact in the Unequal variants 
of the HiLo game. This is in line with the findings of Chmura et al. (2005), who study a 
number of variants of the HiLo game with an unequal and efficient equilibrium that strictly 
Pareto dominates an equal equilibrium and find that, irrespective of the degree of payoff 
inequality of the efficient equilibrium, around 70 percent of participants choose a strategy 
leading to the unequal but efficient equilibrium. The main difference is that, in our 
experiment, the corresponding strategy is chosen more often, on average 86 percent of the 
time, possibly because of the bargaining frame of our game (Chmura et al. presented their 
games as 2×2 matrices). More importantly for our main focus, the degree of inequality has no 
impact on the effectiveness of the closeness cues in the Pizza Night game. The single-disc 
claimants who are favoured by the inequality claim the close disc between 90 and 96 percent 
of the time (see view C3), those disfavoured by the inequality do so between 87 and 93 
percent of the time (see view C4). If one considers that in the most extreme payoff pair ({4, 
17}) one player earns more than four times than the other, our participants seem to have a 
very high tolerance of inequality.   
Varying the payoff pair has systematic effects in Battle of the Sexes games, with and 
without labelling cues. In the games without labelling cues, it is clear that there is a tendency 
for the more valuable disc to be claimed less often when the payoff differences are small than 
when they are large (21 percent in the {10, 11} payoff pair versus 73 percent in the {4, 17} 
pair – see N5 in Table 3b). This effect – already documented by Crawford et al. (2008) and 
 18 
Isoni et al. (2013, 2019) – is also visible in games with labelling cues (see views C5 and C6 
in Table 3a). 
 
5.3  The effects of labelling cues 
By virtue of allowing for spatial cues of different strength, the bargaining table design is 
particularly well-suited to investigate the independent effects of labelling in different games. 
Following Isoni et al. (2013, 2014 and 2019), our design allows for such an investigation 
using a comparison of coordination success in games with and without those cues. Before 
turning to those effects, we describe how we measure coordination success with the data 
generated by our experiment, and how we use those measures to test hypotheses about 
coordination success.  
Although in the experiment each participant was matched with an anonymous 
opponent, this matching was arbitrary in nature and never resulted in an actual interaction 
between the players. Computing coordination success exclusively on the basis of the arbitrary 
anonymous matches would make an inefficient use of the available data, because in each 
game each player was, effectively, playing against the population of co-players who saw the 
bargaining table in the position of the ‘Other’ player. Therefore, for the tests of our 
hypotheses, we will use a measure called Mean Expected Coordination Success (MECS) 
computed using the legitimate matching procedure already adopted by Isoni et al. (2013, 
2019). For each game view, we match each participant, in turn, with all other participants 
who made decisions in a game view compatible with theirs with respect to the position of the 
discs and the disc values. (For example, for C3 in Figure 2, each player of C3 is matched with 
all players of C4 in a compatible layout except themselves.) For all these legitimate matches, 
we check whether the claims made by the two players overlap – resulting in coordination 
failure – or not – resulting in successful coordination. For each participant, this produces a 
measure of expected coordination success equal to the proportion of matches in which they 
coordinated successfully. For each game, MECS is the average across participants of these 
proportions for the relevant game views. 
Summaries of MECS in all our games, with and without labelling cues, are presented 
in Table 4, pooling across different payoff pairs (a detailed decomposition can be found in 
the Appendix).  
(Insert Table 4 here) 
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 In order to make comparisons of MECS between pairs of games, we use a bootstrap 
method that takes into account the fact that MECS is obtained by repeatedly matching 
participants with each other (making the coordination success statistics for different 
participants not independent of each other). All our statistical tests are based on bootstrapping 
the distribution of the difference between the MECS of the two games being compared.17 
This involves repeatedly sampling participants, with replacement, to obtain 10,000 
replications of the experiment (stratifying over disc layout and payoff pair), and computing a 
MECS difference for the relevant comparison for each replication. This allows us to extract a 
95% confidence interval of the bootstrapped distribution of differences. We will say that 
there is a significant difference in coordination success between the two games being 
compared if this confidence interval does not contain zero.18 
 For each pair of games with and without labelling cues, Table 4 reports the actual 
difference between MECS in the game with cues and the corresponding game without, as 
well as the 95% confidence interval of the bootstrapped distribution of that difference. This 
allows us to see when introducing closeness cues has a significant effect on coordination 
success.  
We can see that closeness cues are highly effective in games without payoff cues. In 
the Pure Coordination game, there is an average increase in MECS of 0.34, which is strongly 
significant (the confidence interval is very far from zero). The effect of closeness cues is also 
significant in the Pizza Night game – a MECS difference of 0.29 – and in the Battle of the 
Sexes game – a difference of 0.13. These data illustrate the typical finding that the same 
labelling cues tend to be used less effectively in the Battle of the Sexes game than in Pure 
Coordination games. They also point to a close similarity of their effects in the Pizza Night 
game compared to the Pure Coordination game. 
In the other games, labelling cues do not result in a significant increase in 
coordination success when they are congruent with efficiency cues. This may be a ceiling 
effect due to the high baseline coordination success in the game without labelling cues (in a 
similar setting, Isoni et al., 2019, do find a significant increase in coordination success, but 
 
17 If we base our comparisons on the coordination success rates computed using the actual (but arbitrary) 
random matches in the relevant games, and compare them with standard non-parametric statistical tests that do 
not take the imperfect statistical independence of the observations into account, all our conclusions remain 
unaffected, except that the difference between coordination success in the Pure Coordination and Pizza Night 
game is significant only at the 10% level. See Appendix I for details. 
18 This approach is a variant of the test used by Isoni et al. (2019). 
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the baseline coordination success was lower). However, when labelling cues are incongruent 
with efficiency cues, there is a significant decrease in coordination success, ranging from –
0.06 in the Lo-Unequal game to –0.12 in the HiLo game. 
 Overall, this analysis shows that our experiment produces the typical effects of 
closeness cues that have been found in previous applications of the bargaining table design. 
We can now turn to the tests of our main hypotheses.  
 
5.4  Tests of the effects of conflict of interest and payoff inequality 
We start from comparisons involving games without payoff cues, in which labelling cues 
provide the only cue for coordination. This will allow us to disentangle the effects of conflict 
of interest and payoff inequality. Our tests are based on bootstrapping the difference in 
MECS between the two relevant games using the method described in Section 5.3. Table 5 
summarises the implications of our hypotheses, and reports the actual MECS differences and 
the bootstrapped 95% confidence interval. 
(Insert Table 5 here) 
 
Result 1 – Validation. In the presence of labelling cues, coordination success is significantly 
higher in Pure Coordination than in Battle of the Sexes games. 
Support. MECS is 0.80 in PC*, and just 0.51 in BS*, a difference of 0.29, which is obviously 
statistically significant according to our bootstrap test (the 95% CI is [0.237, 0.348]). As we 
saw in Table 2, the close disc was claimed much more often in the Pure Coordination than in 
Battle of the Sexes game. Hypothesis 1 is strongly supported.  
Result 2 – Effect of Conflict of Interest. In the presence of labelling cues, coordination 
success is significantly higher in Pizza Night games than in Battle of the Sexes games. 
Support. MECS is 0.73 in PN*, and 0.51 in BS*, a difference of 0.22, which is statistically 
significant according to our bootstrap test (95% CI [0.162, 0.285]). Unlike in BS*, in which 
the close claims represent 63 percent of the single-disc, in PN* the close disc was claimed 
overall by 91 percent of single-disc claimants, suggesting that closeness is used much more 
effectively in that game. This provides strong support for Hypothesis 2: conflict of interest 
has a major disruptive effect on tacit coordination. 
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Result 3 – Effect of Payoff Inequality. In the presence of labelling cues, coordination 
success is significantly higher in Pure Coordination games than in Pizza Night games. 
Support. MECS is 0.80 in PC*, and 0.73 in PN*, a difference of 0.07, which is just 
significant in our bootstrap test (95% CI [0.001, 0.141]). This provides support for 
Hypothesis 3, and indicates that payoff inequality does impede coordination. However, this 
effect is rather small. Single-disc close claims go down only slightly, from 94 percent in PC* 
to 91 percent overall in PN*. Because so many claim the close disc in PC*, there is little 
variation in individuals’ coordination success for that game, and even small differences end 
up being significant. The longer response times in PN* indicate that participants have to think 
longer when coordination results in unequal material payoffs. 
 Having established that payoff inequality has some, albeit minor, disruptive effects on 
coordination success, we can now turn to the question of whether those effects also appear in 
the presence of efficiency cues with our tests of Hypotheses 4 and 5. 
Result 4 – Inequality of the efficient equilibrium. Coordination success is not significantly 
different between HiLo and Hi-Unequal games, both (a) in the absence and (b) in the 
presence of labelling cues. 
Support. MECS is 0.77 in HiLo, and 0.76 in Hi≠Lo, a difference of 0.01, which is not 
significant in our bootstrap test (95% CI [-0.055, 0.101]). This gives part (a) of the result. 
MECS is 0.78 in Hi*Lo, and 0.80 in Hi≠*Lo, a difference of -0.02 (95% CI [-0.094, 0.057]); 
it is 0.65 in HiLo*, and 0.66 in Hi≠Lo*, a difference of -0.01 (95% CI [-0.081, 0.083]). 
Neither difference is statistically significant, giving part (b) of the result. Regardless of which 
equilibrium is label-salient, making the efficient equilibrium unequal does not decrease 
coordination success. 
Result 5 – Inequality of the inefficient equilibrium. Coordination success is not 
significantly different between Lo-Unequal and HiLo games, both (a) in the absence and (b) 
in the presence of labelling cues. 
Support. MECS is 0.74 in HiLo≠, and 0.77 in HiLo, a difference of -0.03 (95% CI [-0.099, 
0.056]), which is not significantly different in our bootstrap test, giving part (a) of the result. 
MECS is 0.80 in Hi*Lo≠, and 0.78 in Hi*Lo, a difference of 0.02 (95% CI [-0.063, 0.096]); it 
is 0.68 in HiLo≠*, and 0.65 in HiLo*, a difference of 0.03 (95% CI [-0.061, 0.102]). Neither 
difference is statistically significant, giving part (b) of the result. Regardless of which 
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equilibrium is label-salient, making the inefficient equilibrium unequal does not increase 
coordination success. 
 
6. Two key insights about the effects of payoff inequality on coordination 
Many real-world interactions pose coordination problems that need to be resolved without 
communication. Schelling (1960) suggested that players can coordinate by relying on 
commonly known cues about payoffs or labels, even when the players’ preferences are not 
perfectly aligned. The evidence supports Schelling’s hypothesis, but in games with a Battle of 
the Sexes structure, successful coordination is much harder to achieve. 
 We have identified two possible causes of such coordination failures: conflict of 
interest – players prefer different equilibria – and payoff inequality – conditional on 
coordinating, one player’s payoff is higher – and devised a new game – the Pizza Night game 
– to isolate the effect of payoff inequality. We have also explored the effect of payoff 
inequality in games in which one equilibrium Pareto dominates the other. Our experimental 
results provide a clear picture about the effects of inequality on the likelihood that tacit 
bargaining games result in an agreement yielding positive payoffs for both players. These 
provide two key insights. 
 The first insight is that, when salient labels provide the only cues to solve a 
coordination problem, payoff inequality does not provide much of an obstacle. In the Pizza 
Night game coordination success is consistently high, irrespective of the size of the resulting 
differences in material payoffs. On average, two randomly chosen players are expected to 
coordinate 73 percent of the time, only slightly less often than the 80 percent observed in 
Pure Coordination games. This reveals a willingness by players to accept even quite large 
payoff inequalities for the sake of coordination.  
 The second insight is that, in games with a bargaining frame like the ones we study, 
payoff inequality is not able, on its own, to inhibit tacit agreements that result in efficient 
outcomes, irrespective of whether these are supported or opposed by labelling cues. Finding 
that there are situations in which efficient outcomes are not disregarded if they come with 
sizeable inequalities in material payoffs is an important result from the point of view of 
economics. Most market transactions involve the creation of mutual benefit, but this may 
often result in distributions of surplus that systematically favour one of the parties. Our 
results indicate that the fact that a certain agreement results in an unequal outcome is not 
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necessarily an obstacle to the maximisation of efficiency, even in cases in which only one of 
the parties stands to benefit.  
Overall, our findings strongly suggest that the greatest challenge to tacit coordination 
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 (i)   C3 = ‹[L, S]*, [L, S]› (ii)   C4 = ‹[S, L]*, [S, L]› 
 
   
 (iii)   N3 = ‹[L, S], [L, S]› (iv)   N4 = ‹[S, L], [S, L]› 
 
Figure 1 – The Pizza Night game in the Bargaining Table frame 
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Table 1 – Games and views with and without labelling cues 
 
 
PC* S A* B PC S A B
A* S, S 0, 0 A S, S 0, 0
B 0, 0 S, S B 0, 0 S, S
Row: C1 = ‹[S, S]*, [S, S]› Row: N1 = ‹[S, S], [S, S]› 
Col: C1 = {(S, S)*, (S, S)} Col: N1 = ‹[S, S], [S, S]›
PC* L A* B PC L A B
A* L, L 0, 0 A L, L 0, 0
B 0, 0 L, L B 0, 0 L, L
Row: C2 = ‹[L, L]*, [L, L]› Row: N2 = ‹[L, L], [L, L]› 
Col: C2 = ‹[L, L]*, [L, L]› Col: N2 = ‹[L, L], [L, L]›
Pizza Night PN* A* B PN A B
A* L, S 0, 0 A L, S 0, 0
B 0, 0 L, S B 0, 0 L, S
Row: C3 = ‹[L, S]*, [L, S]› Row: N3 = ‹[L, S], [L, S]› 
Col: C4 = ‹[S, L]*, [S, L]› Col: N4 = ‹[S, L], [S, L]›
BS* A* B BS A B
A* L, S 0, 0 A L, S 0, 0
B 0, 0 S, L B 0, 0 S, L
Row: C5 = ‹[L, S]*, [S, L]› Row: N5 = ‹[L, S], [S, L]› 
Col: C6 = ‹[S, L]*, [L, S]› Col: N5 = ‹[L, S], [S, L]› 
HiLo Hi*Lo A* B HiLo* A* B HiLo A B
A* L, L 0, 0 A* S, S 0, 0 A L, L 0, 0
B 0, 0 S, S B 0, 0 L, L B 0, 0 S, S
Row: C7 = ‹[L, L]*, [S, S]› Row: C8 = ‹[S, S]*, [L, L]› Row: N6 = ‹[L, L], [S, S]› 
Col: C7 = ‹[L, L]*, [S, S]› Col: C8 = ‹[S, S]*, [L, L]› Col: N6 = ‹[L, L], [S, S]› 
Lo-Unequal Hi*Lo≠ A* B HiLo≠* A* B HiLo≠ A B
A* L, L 0, 0 A* L, S 0, 0 A L, L 0, 0
B 0, 0 L, S B 0, 0 L, L B 0, 0 L, S
Row: C9 = ‹[L, L]*, [L, S]› Row: C11 = ‹[L, S]*, [L, L]› Row: N7 = ‹[L, L], [L, S]› 
Col: C10 = ‹[L, L]*, [S, L]› Col: C12 = ‹[S, L]*, [L, L]› Col: N8 = ‹[L, L], [S, L]›
Hi-Unequal Hi≠*Lo A* B Hi≠Lo* A* B Hi≠Lo A B
A* L, S 0, 0 A* S, S 0, 0 A L, S 0, 0
B 0, 0 S, S B 0, 0 L, S B 0, 0 S, S
Row: C13 = ‹[L, S]*, [S, S]› Row: C15 = ‹[S, S]*, [L, S]› Row: 
Col: C14 = ‹[S, L]*, [S, S]› Col: C16 = ‹[S, S]*, [S, L]› Col:
Pure 
Coordination
Battle of the 
Sexes
Game
N9 = ‹[L, S], [S, S]› 
N10 = ‹[S, L], [S, S]›
Games with labelling cues Games without labelling cues
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Table 2a – Summary of claims in games with labelling cues 
Game View 






time (secs.) None Close Far Both 
         
PC* 
C1 = ‹[S, S]*, [S, S]›  and 
C2 = ‹[L, L]*, [L, L]›  
4 352 24 20 94 n/a 4.06 
         
PN* C3 = ‹[L, S]*, [L, S]›  1 170 13 16 93 n/a 6.52 
 C4 = ‹[S, L]*, [S, L]› 2 167 22 9 88 n/a 6.29 
         
BS* C5 = ‹[L, S]*, [S, L]›  2 110 83 5 57 57 7.90 
 C6 = ‹[S, L]*, [L, S]› 2 137 59 2 70 30 6.67 
         
Hi*Lo C7 = ‹[L, L]*, [S, S]›  0 175 21 4 89 89 5.34 
         
HiLo* C8 = ‹[S, S]*, [L, L]›  0 40 157 3 20 80 6.14 
         
Hi*Lo≠ C9 = ‹[L, L]*, [L, S]›  0 176 20 4 90 n/a 6.62 
 C10 = ‹[L, L]*, [S, L]› 0 178 18 4 91 91 6.03 
         
HiLo≠* C11 = ‹[L, S]*, [L, L]›  1 31 164 4 16 n/a 7.32 
 C12 = ‹[S, L]*, [L, L]› 1 38 155 6 20 80 7.13 
         
Hi≠*Lo C13 = ‹[L, S]*, [S, S]›  0 178 19 3 90 90 4.77 
 C14 = ‹[S, L]*, [S, S]› 2 176 18 4 91 n/a 5.31 
         
Hi≠Lo* C15 = ‹[S, S]*, [L, S]›  0 39 158 3 20 80 6.10 
  C16 = ‹[S, S]*, [S, L]› 1 36 156 7 19 n/a 6.05 
None = no disc claimed; Close = only close disc claimed; Far = only far disc claimed; Both = both discs claimed. Single-disc Close claims = 
percentage of close claims conditional on only one disc being claimed. Single-disc High-Value claims = percentage of claims on the more 
valuable disc conditional on only one disc being claimed. Response time = time elapsed between the moment the game was shown on the screen 
and the moment claims were submitted. 
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Table 2b – Summary of claims in games without labelling cues 
 
Game View 







response time  None Left Right Both 
                  
PC N1 = ‹[S, S], [S, S]› and 6 158 213 23 43 n/a 5.70 
  N2 = ‹[L, L], [L, L]›                
                  
PN N3 = ‹[L, S], [L, S]›  2 68 107 23 39 n/a 7.11 
  N4 = ‹[S, L], [S, L]› 7 76 103 14 42 n/a 7.57 
                  
BS N5 = ‹[L, S], [S, L]›  2 95 91 12 51 48 7.41 
         
HiLo N6 = ‹[L, L], [S, S]›  0 99 93 8 52 91 5.09 
                  
HiLo≠ N7 = ‹[L, L], [L, S]›  1 98 97 4 50 89 6.32 
  N8 = ‹[L, L], [S, L]› 0 98 97 5 50 85 5.83 
                  
Hi≠Lo N9 = ‹[L, S], [S, S]›  0 86 108 6 44 87 5.56 
  N10 = ‹[S, L], [S, S]› 0 86 108 6 44 90 5.07 
None = no disc claimed; Left = only left disc claimed; Right = only right disc claimed; Both = both discs claimed. Single-disc Left claims = 
percentage of left claims conditional on only one disc being claimed. Single-disc High-Value claims = percentage of claims on the more valuable disc 
conditional on only one disc being claimed. Response time = time elapsed between the moment the game was shown on the screen and the moment 










{10, 11} {8, 13} {6, 15} {4, 17} 
          
  Single-disc Close claims (%)  
PC* S C1 = ‹[S, S]*, [S, S]›  96 94 96 98 
PC* L C2 = ‹[L, L]*, [L, L]›  85 98 90 94 
        
PN* C3 = ‹[L, S]*, [L, S]›  96 91 94 90 
  C4 = ‹[S, L]*, [S, L]› 87 90 84 93 
        
BS* C5 = ‹[L, S]*, [S, L]› 44 57 47 80 
  C6 = ‹[S, L]*, [L, S]› 82 68 71 59 
        
  Single-disc Efficient claims (%)  
Hi*Lo C7 = ‹[L, L]*, [S, S]›  82 88 92 96 
      
HiLo* C8 = ‹[S, S]*, [L, L]›  80 76 83 80 
      
Hi*Lo≠ C9 = ‹[L, L]*, [L, S]›  85 92 88 94 
 C10 = ‹[L, L]*, [S, L]› 90 94 88 92 
      
HiLo≠* C11 = ‹[L, S]*, [L, L]›  76 86 92 84 
 C12 = ‹[S, L]*, [L, L]› 77 77 85 82 
      
Hi≠*Lo C13 = ‹[L, S]*, [S, S]›  90 90 88 90 
 C14 = ‹[S, L]*, [S, S]› 92 85 94 91 
      
Hi≠Lo* 
C15 = ‹[S, S]*, [L, S]›  71 90 77 82 








{10, 11} {8, 13} {6, 15} {4, 17} 
          
  Single-disc Left claims (%)  
PC S N1 = ‹[S, S], [S, S]› 38 45 42 47 
PC L N2 = ‹[L, L], [L, L]› 47 27 45 49 
        
PN N3 = ‹[L, S], [L, S]› 35 44 37 39 
  N4 = ‹[S, L], [S, L]› 37 47 36 50 
        
BS N5 = ‹[L, S], [S, L]›  49 49 57 49 
      
  Single-disc High-value claims (%)  
BS N5 = ‹[L, S], [S, L]›  21 49 49 73 
      
  Single-disc Efficient claims (%)  
HiLo N6 = ‹[L, L], [S, S]›  90 94 91 88 
      
HiLo≠ N7 = ‹[L, L], [L, S]›  87 82 94 94 
 N8 = ‹[L, L], [S, L]› 79 82 88 90 
      
Hi≠Lo N9 = ‹[L, S], [S, S]›  92 90 88 80 




Table 4 – Summary of coordination success 
 
No labelling cues   Labelling cues   MECS difference 
Game MECS   Game MECS   Actual 95% CI 
        
PC 0.46  PC* 0.80  0.34 [0.279, 0.387] 
        
PN 0.44  PN* 0.73  0.29 [0.233, 0.350] 
        
BS 0.38  BS* 0.51  0.13 [0.070, 0.187] 
        
HiLo 0.77 
 Hi*Lo 0.78  0.01 [-0.078, 0.094] 
 HiLo* 0.65  -0.12 [-0.197, -0.024] 
        
HiLo≠ 0.74 
 Hi*Lo≠ 0.80  0.06 [-0.021, 0.112] 
 HiLo≠* 0.68  -0.06 [-0.136, -0.002] 
        
Hi≠Lo 0.76 
 Hi≠*Lo 0.80  0.04 [-0.017, 0.117] 
  Hi≠Lo* 0.66   -0.10 [-0.159, -0.020] 
MECS = Mean Expected Coordination Success computed using the legitimate matching procedure. 
95% CI obtained by bootstrapping the difference between coordination success in the game with 
labelling cues and the corresponding game without labelling cues. 
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Actual 95% CI 
     
H1 Validation MECS(PC*) > MECS(BS*) 0.29 [0.237, 0.348] 
     
H2 Conflict of interest MECS(PN*) > MECS(BS*) 0.22 [0.162, 0.285] 
     
H3 Inequality MECS(PC*) > MECS(PN*) 0.07 [0.001, 0.141] 
     
H4 (a) Inequality of efficient 
equilibrium 
MECS(HiLo) < MECS(Hi≠Lo) 0.01 [-0.055, 0.101] 
H4 (b) 
MECS(Hi*Lo) < MECS(Hi≠*Lo) -0.02 [-0.094, 0.057] 
MECS(HiLo*) < MECS(Hi≠Lo*) -0.01 [-0.081, 0.083] 
     
H5 (a) Inequality of inefficient 
equilibrium 
MECS(HiLo≠) > MECS(HiLo) -0.03 [-0.099, 0.056] 
H5 (b) 
MECS(Hi*Lo≠) > MECS(Hi*Lo) 0.02 [-0.063, 0.096] 
MECS(HiLo≠*) > MECS(HiLo*) 0.03 [-0.061, 0.102] 
Actual MECS difference between first and second game specified in hypothesis statement. 95% CI obtained by 
bootstrapping the difference between coordination success in the relevant games. 
 
 
 
 
